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7.1  Introduction 
The U.S.  government pursues a number of policies affecting imports of 
oil. An excise tax is imposed on sales of  gasoline, and the U.S. govern- 
ment maintains “strategic reserves” of oil in salt domes. There has been 
discussion of imposing a tariff on oil both to raise revenue and to improve 
the U.S. terms of  trade. 
Oil presents U.S.  policymakers with a situation that is unusual in three 
respects.  First,  in  most  areas where  a protectionist  policy  has  been 
pursued by the government, the motivation has been primarily domestic, 
to maintain output and employment levels in different regions and sec- 
tors. The second-best nature of tariffs and quotas for these purposes is 
well known.  In contrast, many of  the existing and proposed policies 
toward oil have been justified partly on optimal tariff grounds; the United 
States is a large importer whose level of imports affects the world price. 
From a national perspective, restricting imports is a first-best policy. 
Indeed, the current level of  protection may be too low. 
Second, oil is an exhaustible resource. Imports in any period affect in 
an essential way not only the international price today but the world 
equilibrium in all future periods. The static framework of  most trade- 
theoretic tariff analysis is inappropriate. 
Third, the strategic behavior on the part of  agents other than the U.S. 
government is important for the effects of  policy. For one thing, the 
Organization of  Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) constitutes a 
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large supplier. For another, U.S. policies affect the storage and extrac- 
tion behavior of private agents in the domestic and world economies. The 
interactions of  these groups must be taken into account. Again, a static 
framework assuming that all agents except the U.S.  government  are 
atomistic is inappropriate. 
These three considerations make an analysis of  optimal commercial 
policy in terms of traditional trade models difficult. Before an analysis of 
the welfare effects of the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) can be 
attempted, an analytic framework identifying its effects on U.S. welfare 
must  be specified. Our purpose here is to develop such an analytic 
framework. The  model we develop does not incorporate all aspects of the 
SPR that we believe to be important. Nevertheless, it suggests a set of 
considerations that necessarily arise in a strategic setting between a large 
importing country and a monopolistic supplier. 
The remainder of the introduction provides a discussion of  the back- 
ground of  the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve and an outline of  our 
analysis. 
7.1.1  Background 
The current pattern of general public concern about energy supplies is 
in sharp contrast to the prevailing pattern before 1973. In the early years 
after World War 11, the United States was essentially self-sufficient  with 
respect to crude oil supplies. Concern, largely by members of  the pe- 
troleum industry, was focused not on problems of shortage but on price 
effects of abundance. As a result, the US. government imposed an oil 
imports quota in 1959 of 9 percent of the estimated domestic demand. 
However, imports gradually increased over time and reached approx- 
imately 23 percent of total domestic demand by 1972. In May 1973  import 
quotas were discontinued and a license fee system was substituted. The 
fee system  soon became superfluous, however,  with  the  subsequent 
quadrupling of  world oil  prices  (Bohi and Russell  1978, 7, 230-35). 
Despite the quota, considerable excess capacity for crude oil production 
developed during the sixties, and regulatory federal and state agencies 
distributed  production  allocations to the various producers  of  crude 
petroleum. The real price of  oil was continuously dropping during the 
sixties until October 1973. 
Government storage of oil began in the United States in 1909 with the 
creation of  the Naval Petroleum Reserves which serve exclusively the 
needs of the U.S. defense forces. As a result of the increase in oil imports 
to the United States and the Arab oil embargo in 1973-74, there were 
calls for government storage of  petroleum to be held out of  ground, 
available in the short run in relatively large amounts (Glatt 1982,7-8). In 
1973  President Nixon established Project Independence with the purpose 
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International Energy Agency (IEA) of  oil consuming countries in the 
OECD  established the  International Energy Program (IEP). Participants 
in the program pledged to  establish reserves equal to sixty days consump- 
tion (to increase to ninety days in 1980). These reserves were to include 
private storage (which at that time was sufficient to meet the require- 
ments in all the participating countries). The Strategic Petroleum Re- 
serves  (SPR) program  was  established  under  the Energy Policy and 
Conservation Act (EPCA) of  1975 as the U.S. component of  the IEA 
program.’ 
The EPCA is a broad piece of legislation designed to “increase domes- 
tic energy supplies and availability: to restrain energy demand (and) to 
prepare for energy emergencies”  (Glatt 1982, 9). The act contains a 
detailed outline for the operation of  the SPR. It explicitly  claims that “the 
storage of  petroleum  products will  diminish the vulnerability of  the 
United States to the effects of  a severe energy supply interruption and 
will  provide limited  protection  from the short-term consequences  in 
supplies of  petroleum products.” A somewhat different purpose of the 
SPR was suggested by Senator Henry Jackson, who was a strong sup- 
porter of the SPR: “. . .  with a Strategic Petroleum Reserve, we will have 
greater credibility, as I see it, in dealing with this problem (oil prices), and 
we’ll help to stabilize the price situation, which otherwise could be one of 
great havoc.  ”z 
The EPCA determined that the SPR could contain as many as 1  billion 
barrels but should have no less than 500 million barrels. It also required 
the establishment of  Industrial Petroleum Reserves by the oil industry 
and Regional Petroleum Reserves. The Federal Energy Administration 
(FEA) was given control over the SPR. 
Since 1977 oil has been stored at five underground salt domes and salt 
mine sites in Louisiana and Texas. Purchases of oil proceeded at a rate of 
21 thousand barrels per day during 1977  and 162 thousand barrels per day 
during 1978 (see table 7.1). 
In late 1978, however, as a consequence of tight oil market conditions 
associated with the Iranian crisis, the Carter administration postponed 
purchases of  oil for the stockpile. At that time seven stockpiling nations 
agreed to curtail stockpiling acquisitions if  such acquisition would “result 
in any pressure on the world oil market” (Glatt 1982, 22-23).  Conse- 
quently, purchases fell to a daily rate of 67 thousand barrels in 1979 and 
44 thousand barrels in 1980. In 1980, however, oil market conditions 
slackened and purchases  resumed.  In that year  Congress passed  the 
Energy Security Act which required that the president acquire reserves at 
a minimum rate of 100 thousand barrels per day (Glatt 1982,ll).  In fact, 
during 1981 and 1982 the average acquisition rate has far exceeded that 
minimum.  An issue for the management of  the stockpile is  whether 
acquisitions (or drawdowns) should respond to world oil market condi- Table 7.1  Average Crude Petroleum Production, Petroleum Consumption and End of Year Petroleum Stocksa 
Millions of  Barrels 
(stocks) 
Thousands of  Barrels per Day 
World Minus  IEA~ 
Total  USSR and  us  Con-  us  OECDd 
World  China  OPEC  us  Con-  sumption  (inc.  (inc . 
Production  Production  Production  Production  sumption  (inc. US)  SPR"  SPR)  SPR  US) 
NA  1973  55748  46193  30989  8208  17308  34150  -  1008  - 
1974  55910  45595  30729  8774  16653  32960  -  1074  -  NA 
1975  52552  41837  27155  8375  16322  31870  -  1133  -  NA 
1976  57405  45592  30738  8132  17461  33770  -  1112  -  NA 
1977  59795  47239  31278  8245  18431  34930  21  1312  7  3152 
1978  60165  46898  29805  8707  18847  35880  162  1278  67  3089 
1979  62698  49116  30928  8552  18513  35900  67  1341  91  3358 
1980  59452  45568  26890  8597  17056  33000  44  1392  108  3566 
1981  55710  41885  22665  8.572  16058  31400  256  1484  230  3537 
1982 (March)  51800  37980  18415  8597  15560  31600  182  1401  249  NA 
SOURCE:  U.S. Department of  Energy, Monthly Energy Review, September 1982. 
aPetroleum stocks include crude oil, unfinished oils, natural gas plant liquids, and refined products. 
bThe International Energy Agency includes twenty-one member nations (see details in the Monthly Energy Review). 
'Strategic Petroleum Reserves. 
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tions (as the IEA agreement would suggest) or proceed independently of 
world  market  conditions  (as implied to some extent  by  the Energy 
Security Act of  1980). Our analysis explores this issue. 
As of  March 1982 the reserves contained 250 million barrels of  crude 
oil, while the current plan is to place 750 million barrels of  oil in storage 
by the end of 1989. Since 1975  several studies have analyzed the ideal size 
of  the SPR. They all try to determine the level of  reserves that could 
maintain the rate of consumption in a period of disruption at the rate in 
“normal” years. The recommended size varies from 500 to 1000 million 
barrels (Glatt 1982, 41). 
The storage facilities in the salt domes and mines have created several 
technical problems, including the possibility that the crude petroleum 
could not be pumped out of  storage. It seems, however, that most of 
these technical issues are now resolved. Since only crude petroleum is 
stored in the SPR, several different types of  crude oil must be stored to 
provide for different oil by-products. 
An important and difficult question for the FEA to consider is the 
definition of supply interruption that triggers drawdowns from the SPR. 
An integral issue is the size of the drawdown and the distribution of  the 
reserves in a case of  supply interruption. These issues, as well as the 
decision to establish the SPR in the first place, require an understanding 
of  the rationale and the objectives of  the SPR. 
The U.S. oil industry requires about 1  billion barrels of  crude oil as 
minimum operating stocks, which equals about sixty days of petroleum 
consumption. The current goal of the SPR would almost double the days 
of  consumption from the U.S. stock (table 7.1). The United States is a 
large consumer of  oil; it consumes about 36-40  percent of  world oil 
production  (excluding the USSR and China). OPEC produces about 
50-55  percent of the world production (excluding the USSR and China). 
As such, we suggest the view that the world oil market consists of  one 
large producer (OPEC) and one large consumer (the United States) is a 
reasonable  first approximation. However, the effect of  other (small) 
producers and consumers as well as the large local production of oil in the 
United States (about 60 percent of current U.S. consumption) should be 
considered in extensions of  this paper. 
7.1.2  Outline and Summary 
In section 7.2 we develop a simple two-period model of an oil import- 
ing country (the United States) and an oil exporter (OPEC). In section 
7.3 we examine the competitive equilibrium of this model. We show that 
under certainty and in the presence of a full set of contingent commodity 
markets there is no role for inventories, not to mention government 
inventories, of  any form since there are costs of  holding inventories. 
Introducing a “convenience yield” on inventories, on the basis of  their 242  Jonathan Eaton/Zvi Eckstein 
use in facilitating production,  provides a justification for holdings of 
inventories on the part of the private sector. In the absence of production 
externalities, however, there is no reason for the government to hold 
inventories. Introducing uncertainty by itself does not provide an argu- 
ment in favor of U.S. private inventories. Uncertainty combined with the 
absence of full contingent commodity markets or U.S. property rights in 
OPEC  does imply a role for inventories as a form of portfolio diversifica- 
tion on the part of  the United States. Private agents, however, have an 
incentive to hold inventories at the level that maximizes expected U.S. 
national welfare. In the absence of  externalities, then, we can find no 
argument  in  favor  of  U.S.  government  inventories when  all agents, 
including the government, behave competitively. 
Eckstein and Eichenbaum (1982) show that when oil suppliers are 
competitive and U.S. imports have an effect on oil prices, an optimal, 
time consistent tariff policy exists for the United States. However, there 
is no role for government inventories. Eckstein and Eichenbaum conjec- 
tured that if there is a case for government inventories it should stem from 
strategic considerations arising from the fact that oil prices decrease as 
U.S. inventories rise. 
In section 7.4 we turn to a strategic setting in which the U.S. govern- 
ment and OPEC both have the potential  to exercise market power. 
Imposing  the optimal tariff  each period  (the strategy considered  by 
Eckstein and Eichenbaum 1982) provides the first-best means for the 
government to exploit its market power. However, unless the govern- 
ment sets its tariffs before OPEC establishes its price each period, the 
government has no incentive to set a tariff at the ex ante optimal level at 
the time it makes its tariff decision. 
In the absence of equity investment by OPEC in the United States the 
ex post optimal tariff is in fact zero. If  OPEC has invested in U.S. equity, 
however, the optimal ex post tariff is positive as long as oil and capital are 
complements in production. The tariff acts indirectly as a tax on OPEC’s 
capital income. In anticipation of the tariff, OPEC sets a lower price in 
the second period. OPEC  reduces its price so much that the U.S. price is 
actually lower despite the tariff. In addition, equity investment by OPEC 
acts directly to reduce OPEC’s second period price. The reason is that 
OPEC takes into account the effect of its pricing decision on the rate of 
return on its investment in the United States. When capital and oil are 
substitutes, a higher oil price means a lower return. There are thus two 
channels whereby  a high level of  equity investment by OPEC in the 
United States acts to reduce the second period price of oil. Nevertheless, 
even when equity holdings are positive, the government would increase 
U.S. welfare if  it could credibly impose the tariff that is optimal from an 
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In this context inventories can act as a second-best substitute for a 
tariff. The government can reduce the period 2 price by buying inventor- 
ies in period 1  and selling them in period 2. In section 7.4 we show how, 
given the period 1  price, the government has an incentive to buy inventor- 
ies in period 1  and to sell them in period 2 in order to lower the period 2 
price. No atomistic private agent has an incentive to pursue this policy 
since he would take the second period  price as given.  Whether  the 
government’s ex post optimal inventory response actually raises U.S. 
welfare  vis-a-vis the no inventory situation cannot be  ascertained in 
general. In fact it could go either way. 
Nichols and Zeckhauser (1977) show how, in the framework we con- 
sider here  (in the absence of  taxes  or investment  of  any form), an 
inventory policy can raise U.S. welfare as well as OPEC’s. An inventory 
policy reduces the distortion resulting from OPEC’s monopoly power. 
The United States and OPEC share the gain. We present their example in 
section 7.5. We find, however, that their result is very sensitive to their 
specification of the problem. We  show in another example that if OPEC’s 
utility function is logarithmic rather than linear in each period’s consump- 
tion, a U.S. inventory policy lowers U.S. welfare relative to a no inven- 
tory situation. A lower U.S. welfare is also obtained when OPEC and the 
government set price  and inventory  simultaneously rather than with 
OPEC acting as a Stackelberg leader. In each case the positive impact of 
the anticipation of  a U.S. inventory on the first period price more than 
offsets its negative impact on second period price. When the government 
chooses inventories, the period 1  price is a bygone so that the government 
nevertheless has an incentive to set inventories at a positive level. In this 
case the government’s capacity to acquire a stockpile actually reduces 
U.S. welfare? These results imply that if a government inventory policy is 
to raise  U.S. welfare, inventory purchases must respond to OPEC’s 
prices, that is, OPEC must act as a Stackelberg leader in setting price 
each period. Another example shows that when the government acts as a 
Stackelberg leader in setting inventories, the optimal level is zero. 
Section 7.6 contains a discussion of some other work that considers the 
desirability of government inventories. Here we discuss papers by Mas- 
kin and Newbery (1978), Wright and Williams (1982), and Tolley and 
Wilman (1977). Finally, section 7.7 contains some concluding remarks. 
7.2  The Model 
In this section we describe the main features of the model considered in 
this paper. Our  focus is on bilateral trade in an exhaustible resource, oil, 
that together with capital enters into production of  a single consumed 
good. There are two nations: the oil consuming country-USA;  and the 244  Jonathan EatonIZvi Eckstein 
oil supplying country-OPEC.  The extraction costs of  oil are zero and 
there is no depreciation of capital. Furthermore, the consumption good is 
only produced in the USA. 
There are two periods of consumption and production in the model. If 
the consumption good is stored in the first period it serves as capital in the 
second period.  OPEC can invest some of  its oil revenues in the first 
period  in the USA  and receive  the interest payments in  the second 
period. 
The definitions of  the variables in the model are as follows: 
Ci = consumption in the USA in period i = 1, 2. 
C:= consumption in OPEC in period i  = 1, 2. 
Ki = capital stock in the USA in period i = 1,2,  (K,  is given as an 
AK = K2 -  K1  = investment in capital in the USA in the first period. 
Oi  = consumption of  oil in the USA in period i = 1, 2. 
I  = inventories of  oil in the USA at the end of  the first period. 
Mi  = imports of  oil in the USA in period i  = 1, 2. 
Oi  = one plus the import tax rate on oil in the USA in period i = 1,2. 
6k  = one plus the tax rate on foreign investment in the USA in 
4 =  international price of  oil in terms of  the single consumption 
r = interest  payments on capital investment in the USA  in the 
initial condition). 
period 2. 
good in period i  = 1, 2. 
second period. 
R* = stock of  oil in OPEC at the beginning of  the first period. 
Qi =  F(Ki, Oi)  = output of  the consumption good in the USA in 
period i = 1, 2. F( .,  ) is strictly concave in both arguments. 
H = OPEC investment in the USA in period one. 
D(Z) = Units of oil available in the second period given an inventory of 
Iunits  of oil in the first period. For all Z  >  0,O 5  D(Z)  5  I,  D’(1) 
> 0. I -  D(I)  equals the carrying costs of  oil inventories. 
Preferences of  the representative consumer/producer in the USA and 
OPEC are given, respectively, by 
U(C,, C,) = U(C,)  + PU(C*),  U*(CT, c;)  = U*(CT)  + P*U*(C$), 
where U( .) and U*( .)  are strictly concave, and P and P* are between 
zero and one. Obviously, one may consider a much more complicated 
model in which, for example, the total reserves of oil in OPEC, R*, are 
uncertain, the USA also has an exhaustible stock of oil, extraction of oil is 
costly, there are third countries, and the like. We later consider some 245  U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve 
extensions along these lines, but prefer first to present out model in its 
simplest form. 
While this framework is very simple, we believe that it captures the 
essential relationships between the United States and the oil producing 
countries. First, it recognizes, although in a simple way, that the supply of 
oil depends fundamentally on the intertemporal allocation of resources. 
Second, OPEC countries do receive a large share of  their consumption 
goods from the OECD countries. Third, many OPEC countries have 
substantial investments in OECD countries. Our model allows their oil 
pricing decisions to affect their return on these investments. 
We shall use the model first to consider the competitive allocation of 
resources in the absence of  government intervention. In particular, we 
wish to determine if there is a case for the government to hold inventories 
of  oil in a competitive, perfect foresight world. The “second-best” argu- 
ments in favor of  the SPR are not considered, since we do not want here 
to justify one policy instrument because of  the misuse of another policy 
instrument, 
7.3  The Competitive Case 
The perfect foresight, optimal allocation can be characterized by solv- 
ing the “social planning” problem of the above economy. It is straightfor- 
ward to show that this allocation is identical to the world competitive, 
perfect foresight equilibrium! 
The social planning problem is to maximize 





C1+ C,*+  AK 5  F(K1, Oi), 
Cz  + C,* 5  F(KI+ AK, O,), 
01  + Oz+Z-D(Z) 5  R*, 61 2 0, 82 2 0; 
by choice of C1, C,,  C,*,  C,*,  AK, 01,  02,  and I. Let XI,  X2,  and p be the 
Lagrangian multipliers of equations (2), (3), and (4),  respectively. Equa- 
tions (2) and (3) are the world budget constraints each period. Equation 
(4) states that world  oil consumption  across the two periods cannot 
exceed the total supply, R.  Then, the first-order condition with respect to 
inventories is 
(5)  -p[l-D‘(Z)]  50  (=OifZ>O). 
Given that  >0, since we assume an economy in which oil is consumed 
each period, equation (5)  implies that Z  = 0 if  0 < D’(Z) <1. Given our 246  Jonathan EatonIZvi Eckstein 
assumption that oil does not appreciate in storage, we conclude that in a 
perfect foresight equilibrium there will be no storage of oil. The reason is 
that the economy is better off holding the oil in the ground with zero 
inventory costs than above the ground incurring the cost I -  D(I).  It is 
also obvious that the inclusion of  linear extraction costs does not affect 
the above result. 
It is of interest to see the characterization of the competitive equilib- 
rium resulting from the above planning solution. Given that pi is the real 
priceofoilinperiodi = 1,2,wegetthatpi=(p/hi) = F2(Ki,0i),i  = 1,2, 
from the first-order conditions with respect to Oi.  Then, the equilibrium 
is characterized by the conditions 
and 
(7) 
Equation (6) establishes that the marginal rate of substitution is equal 
to the marginal rate of transformation in both the USA and OPEC, and 
equation (7)  is simply the Hotelling rule for extraction of an exhaustible 
resource? 
7.3.1  Convenience Yield 
We next consider the private storage of  oil. Private stocks of  crude 
petroleum in the United States are in fact as large as the level of  monthly 
sales (about 300-350  million barrels) and their existence should be ex- 
plained. These inventories, termed “operating stocks” by the industry, 
facilitate the process of  getting oil to consumers. In economic terms the 
argument for operating stocks is called the “convenience yield”  (see 
Brennan 1958). It can be modeled analytically using ad hoc functional 
forms of  the costs of holding inventories. These typically yield an inven- 
tory rule that is a function of  oil consumption or output production (see, 
e.g., Eckstein and Eichenbaum 1982). Usually it is assumed that for an 
inventory below some given level, say I*,  there are negative marginal 
costs of inventories where the level I*  is given exogenously. We could 
introduce a convenience yield into our example by considering a storage 
technology, D(Z),  that has the properties D(I) > I,  D”(I)  <  0 over some 
range I < I. The competitive solution would then establish 
as the first-order condition for a maximum. Equation (6) and (7) would 
continue to characterize the optimum. Thus the competitive solution 
would be fully characterized by the conditions 247  U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve 
(9) 
-  r  -  P2 
D’V)  Pl 
The first three of these conditions would also characterize the planner’s 
solution. If  D(Z)  is increasing and differentiable, the solution establishes 
D’(Z*) = 1  both for the social planner and for the competitive equilib- 
rium. The “convenience yield” argument thus justifies private operating 
stocks but not any government SPR. 
7.3.2  Uncertainty 
Another popular reason for private and possibly public inventories is 
given by the existence of  uncertainty about the oil supply or proven oil 
reserves. The argument is based on precautionary savings to smooth final 
consumption.  In the presence of  a full set of  contingent  commodity 
markets, this argument seems without merit. Private agents could opti- 
mally insure by trading contingent claims. If  storage is costly (i.e., if D(Z) 
< I), then  an  allocation  (supportable by  a competitive  equilibrium) 
without  storage exists which is Pareto superior to any allocation with 
storage. This result would not extend to a situation in which extraction 
costs are nonlinear, however. 
It is possible that a full set of contingent claim markets does not exist. 
However, a more fundamental problem might be the nonexistence of 
property rights in an international context. Private agents in the USA 
cannot obtain property rights over oil that is in the ground in OPEC. 
Americans may be prohibited from acquiring these rights or else they 
may not trust OPEC  governments’ willingness to enforce these rights. In 
this context an additional argument for storing oil emerges: as a form of 
insurance. 
We illustrate this result in the competitive model by assuming that the 
total stock of OPEC  reserves, R*, is not known until period 2.6 We assume 
there are no contingent commodity markets or futures markets. (In fact, 
there are no formal contingent markets, and futures markets are limited, 
none covering a period greater than one year.) All oil is sold on spot 
markets. The  second period price, then, is established by equating second 
period supply, [R*(s) - O1 -  Z + D(I)],  where R*(s)  denotes the oil 
supply in state of nature, s,  to second period demand, 02,  determined by 
the condition 
(10)  Fz(K1 + AK, 02)  = P2. 
This condition implicitly defines a demand function 
(11)  02  = E(KI+ AK, Pz), 248  Jonathan EatonIZvi Eckstein 
which is increasing in K1 + AK and decreasing in P2.  Equilibrium price in 
state s is then established by the condition 
(12)  R*(s) -  01 -  Z  + D(Z) = E[K1 + AK, P~(s)]. 
The interest payment on investment is given by 
(13)  FI[K1 + AK, O~(S)]  =  T(s). 
Consider now the inventory decision of a USA agent in period 1. He 
chooses AK, I, and 01,  taking Pl,  H,  and ~(s)  as given, to maximize: 
(14)  U[F(K1,  01) -  AK + H-  Pi(O1+ I)] 
+ p C II (s) U{F[K1  + AK, E(K1+ AK, P~(s))]  -  T(S) H 
-  P2(s)[E(K1  + AK7  Ms)) -  W>1)  * 
Here n(s)  denotes the probability with which R* = R(s).  The first-order 
conditions for AK and Z  are 
(15a)  U'(Cl) 2  p  Il (s)  ul(C2)  r(s)  (=  0 if  AK > 0). 
(15b) Pl ul(Cl) 5  p $ II  (s)  U'(C2)  P,(s) D'(Z) 
If  AK and I are strictly positive, these conditions imply 
(=  0 if  Z  > 0) 
P2(s) 
Pl  $ n(s) U'(C,)r(s)  = $ n(s) U'(C2)--Df(Z). 
The OPEC first-order conditions with respect to H and M1  yield that 
if  H and M2 are positive. Under certainty, equation (16) is inconsistent 
with (17), which yields the Hotelling rule, (P21Pl) = r, since D'(Z) < 1 
(see [9]; and the left-hand side of [16] is greater than the right-hand side). 
Hence, under certainty, Z = 0. Under uncertainty, when U(CJ is con- 
cave, then both (16) and (17) can hold as equalities. Hence, there are 
equilibria in which I is positive. The reason is that under uncertainty 
Uf(C2)  and  P2(s) are  positively  correlated  when  D(Z)  =  0.  Via 
Shephard's lemma 
dU'(C2) = -  rr'(C2) [O, -  D(Z)] 
dP2 
The diminishing marginal utility of consumption implies that this expres- 
sion is positive (assuming that some oil is imported in period 2). Thus 
when P2(s)  is high, U'(  C,) will also be high: for oil importers, a high price 
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The positive correlation between uI(C2)  and P2(s)  raises the term on 
the right-hand side of equation (16). The expected return on inventories is 
greater because inventories serve as a hedge. This provides a justification 
for holding inventories. 
Two comments about this result are in order. First, if  USA agents 
could buy oil in the futures market or obtain property rights over oil in the 
ground in OPEC, inventories would not be desirable as long as D(Z) <  I. 
Second, this result by itself does not justify the establishment of a govern- 
ment reserve unless the government has a superior storage technology 
(i.e., for the government D(Z) is larger). 
The simplest competitive case thus yields no justification for inventor- 
ies at all. A convenience yield, however, or uncertainty with an incom- 
plete set of contingent commodity markets and imperfect cross-national 
property rights are reasons why oil stocks may benefit the USA. In these 
cases the private sector holds a level of inventories that maximizes social 
welfare as well. Therefore, one may still wonder what scope there is for 
government holdings of  inventories.  Next, we find that once strategic 
considerations in  the relationship between  OPEC and the  USA  are 
introduced, an argument for a government SPR emerges. An argument 
can also emerge, however, in favor of  divesting the government of  its 
capacity to store oil. 
7.4  The Bilateral Monopoly Case: 
A Possible Justification for the SPR 
The presence of national market power frequently yields situations in 
which government intervention can improve national welfare if not world 
welfare. The nationally optimal tariff is an example. 
In fact, in 1978 OPEC provided 65 percent of production in noncom- 
munist countries while the United States accounted for 55 percent of 
consumption in main consuming countries? There is certainly a presump- 
tion of  market power on the part of  OPEC to the extent that it can 
maintain its cohesiveness as a cartel. We assume here that it can. There 
seems to be a presumption of  market power on the USA's part as well, 
although  this is  less strong.  If  we  were  to consider  a  potential  oil- 
importing country cartel consisting of  the OECD or the International 
Energy Agency (IEA) ,  the assumption of a bilateral monopoly situation 
between sellers and buyers would certainly fit the facts closely. Even in 
the absence of  a cartel arrangement among importers, the assumption of 
bilateral monopoly seems to capture much of  the relationship between 
OPEC and the USA. 
In this section we consider how the presence of  a bilateral monopoly 
situation can create an incentive on the part of the government to estab- 
lish an SPR. To focus clearly on strategic considerations, we ignore the 
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next section we show, via example, that by pursuing an inventory policy 
the government can raise USA welfare. But it can also lower it. Because 
results are, in general, sensitive to the specification  of behavior, we find it 
useful to discuss alternative “rules of  the game”  that we can choose 
among. 
7.4.1  Rules of  the Game 
We now consider alternative rules of  behavior in relationships between 
the USA and OPEC. We identify as OPEC‘s strategy variables the oil 
prices (PI,  P2)  and OPEC’s level of  investment in the USA (H). The 
USA’s strategy variables are the tariff rates on oil in periods 1  and 2 (8, - 
1  and O2 - l),  the tax rate on OPEC’s investments (8, -  l),  and the level 
of  government inventory holdings (Zg).  USA private agents, behaving 
atomistically,  choose oil consumption  in  periods 1 and 2, (01,  02), 
investment (AK), and private inventories (Zp) to maximize discounted 
utility.  We assume that  USA private agents correctly anticipate the 
policies that are actually pursued both by OPEC and by the USA but then 
take them parametrically. 
Open Loop Policies 
An open loop policy is one in which values of  the strategy variables are 
set for the current and future periods as of the initial period. Within the 
class of  open loop policies we can identify strategic variables that are 
chosen by one player prior to the choice of some other strategic variable 
by the other player (in which case the first player acts as a Stackelberg 
leader with respect to those variables, the first player taking into account 
the effect of  his choice on the response of  the second player), or the 
decisions are made simultaneously by the two players (in which case they 
act as noncooperative Nash players with respect to those variables, each 
taking the level set by the other player as given in making his choice). 
When the game is specified as open loop, the issue of time consistency 
does not arise. The levels of the strategic variables set in the first period 
(whether in a Nash or Stackelberg fashion) are the ones actually im- 
plemented. A difficulty with this formulation is that the players may not 
have an incentive, in the second period, to follow the open loop solution. 
Because of  this inconsistency, the open loop policy will not be credible. 
Open loop solutions therefore may not be able to explain the behavior 
that  we  observe.  Nevertheless,  the open  loop solution provides  an 
interesting benchmark against which to compare time-consistent solu- 
tions. 
Feedback Solutions and Perfect Equilibria 
An alternative policy is one that maximizes the objectives of  each 




as given. The two players thus play a separate game each period. The 
policies that are pursued each period are the outcome of  that period’s 
game. Hence, the players’ decisions are based on feedback from the 
previous period. When players correctly take into account the effect of 
each period’s decision on the outcome of  subsequent games, then the 
solution to the set of games is described as “perfect.” (See Selten 1975  for 
a discussion of  perfection  and Kydland  1977 for  a discussion of  the 
distinction between open loop and feedback solutions.) The advantage of 
a specification of  this type  is  that  the emerging solution is based on 
behavior that is in each player’s interest at the time he acts. 
Within the class of feedback solutions, we can also distinguish between 
variables that are chosen in a Nash or Stackelberg fashion. This choice 
should be dictated by the underlying technology of  the problem. 
We do not  consider  all possibilities for  structuring  the game.  We 
assume the following rules: 
(a): OPEC acts as a Stackelberg leader each period with respect to 
price (i.e., OPEC chooses PI before USA chooses O1  and Zg; 
OPEC chooses P2 before USA chooses O2 and Ok). 
(b): OPEC and USA act as Nash players with respect to PI,  01, and Zg 
in period 1, and with respect to P2, 02, and Ok in period 2. 
(c): USA acts as a Stackelberg leader each period (i.e., USA chooses 
O1 and Zg  before OPEC chooses PI,  USA chooses O2 and Ok before 
OPEC chooses P2). 
USA private agents take the values of USA and OPEC strategic 
variables as parametric. Subject to these parameters they maxi- 
mize utility. 
Both  OPEC and USA correctly  anticipate  the effect of  their 
policy on USA private agents’ behavior. 




Rule l(a) best captures the strategy implicit in the IEA’s stockpiling 
procedures: purchases are  made contingent upon the oil price that OPEC 
sets. Rules l(b) and l(c) reflect more accurately the stockpiling proce- 
dure embodied in the Energy Security Act: purchases proceed indepen- 
dently of  OPEC’s price. 
7.4.2  The Solution 
We now attempt to characterize the solution to the game. Since first 
period decisions affect outcomes in both periods while, in the second 
period, first period decisions and outcomes are a bygone, it is simplest to 
consider the second period first. 
The Second Period 
Profit-maximizing firms in the USA private sector choose O2  to maxi- 
mize profits. Given the USA domestic price, 02P2,  this behavior implies 
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(19) 
which implicitly defines the second period oil demand function 
F2(K1  + AK, 0,)  5  02P,  (=  0 if 0, >  O), 
(20)  02  = E(02P2, K1+ AK), 
where El < 0, E2 I  0, as oil and capital are substitutes or complements. 
In the case of  constant returns to scale (CRS) in capital and oil this 
function takes the form: 
(20’)  0,  = e(0,P2)(Kl + AK). 
Substituting (20)  into (19) gives second period output as a function of the 
capital stock and the second period oil price: 
(21)  G(K1  + AK, OzP2), 
In the case of  CRS, this function takes the form8 
G1  > 0, G2  < 0. 
(21‘)  g(02Pz)(K1+ 4. 
OPEC’s investment in the USA pays an interest rate r equal, before tax, 
to the marginal product of  capital 
Gl(K1  + AK, 02Pz)[  =  g (02P2)  under CRS] . 
We assume that USA’s objective is to maximize the utility of  USA 
private agents. In period 2, first period  consumption is, of  course, a 
bygone, and the policy in period 2 can only affect period 2 consumption. 
The USA therefore maximizes U(C2)  where 
(22)  C2 = G(&+ AK, OZPZ) -  OkGIH 
-  P,[E(ezP2, K1 + AK) -  D(lg)  -  D(ZP)]. 
Under rules Rl(a)  and Rl(b),  government policy involves choices of 0, 
and ek  that maximize C2  taking Pz,  as well as AK,  Zg,  and 01,  as given. C2 
is strictly decreasing in  Ok, and a maximum, therefore, involves estab- 
lishing 6k at its minimum level (zero), effectively confiscating OPEC 
investments. When Ok = 0, the first-order condition for a maximum with 
respect to Oz  is given by 
(23)  Fz-P2=0, 
which is satisfied at  O2  = 1, the zero tariff condition. Since the USA acts 
taking P2 as given, the optimal tariff is zero. 
An interesting case emerges when USA is constrained to set Ok > 0, 
that is, not to confiscate fully OPEC investment. In this case the first- 
order condition for O2 is 
(24)  F2  = P2  + OkF12 H. 
Thus, if  capital and oil are complements (FI2  > 0) then the tariff on oil 
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substitutes (F12 < 0). Intuitively, the tariff  acts as an indirect tax on 
OPEC investments? If  the USA  is constrained not to tax these invest- 
ments fully, then a tariff redistributes income away from OPEC to the 
USA.  In the CRS case, the formula for the optimal tariff is given by 
in which case the tariff is independent of  P2. When there is no OPEC 
investment in equity or when 0k = 0 (confiscation of  OPEC equity) the 
optimal tariff is zero. 
Consider, now, OPEC’s problem. In period 2 OPEC sets P2 to maxi- 
mize the utility of  OPEC’s period 2 consumption. As with the USA, 
period 1  consumption is at this point a bygone. OPEC  therefore sets P2 to 
maximize period 2 utility,  U*(C,*),  where 
(26)  C,* = P2[02 -  D(P)  -  D(ZP)]  + OkG1 H. 
Under rule Rl(a), OPEC considers the effect of P2 on 02.  The first-order 
condition with respect to P2 is given by: 
(27)  02  -  D(Zg) -  D(rP)  + (P2 + 0kG12H) 
subject to the constraint 
Dividing (27) by  O2  yields 
(27‘) 
where 
the elasticity of  USA oil demand with respect to the USA  price (e2P2), 
and 
<=--  do2  p2 
dP2  02 ’ 
the elasticity of the USA tariff with respect to P2. Note that under CRS, 5 
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Condition (27’) implicitly defines P2 as a function of  Ig, IF,  02, Ok, and 
H.  The most important point to note is that the P2 solving (27‘) falls as Ig 
and ZPrise as a share of 0,.  In addition, when H = 0, P2 falls as 0,  rises to 
maintain a constant domestic price. If H >  0 and G12  >  0 (oil and capital 
are complements), an increase in O2 causes P2 to fall in greater propor- 
tion, lowering not only the world price but the domestic price as well.’O 
This  completes  the  characterization  of  second-period  equilibrium 
under rule Rl(a), with OPEC acting as a Stackelberg leader in setting P2. 
When the level of  02 implied by equation (24) is independent of P2,  as in 
the case under CRS, then the solution under rule Rl(b), with OPEC  and 
USA acting as Nash players, is exactly the same as under rule Rl(a). 
Under rule Rl(c), with the USA acting as a Stackelberg leader in setting 
€12,  the USA can impose the traditional optimal tariff. From equation 
(27’), 02P2  stays constant or falls as Ch2  rises, if GI2H  z 0. In this case the 
optimal tariff rate is infinite. Introducing extraction costs or other buyers 
would modify this result, but the point is that the USA can exert its 
monopsony power via tariffs only if  it is able to commit itself to a tariff 
rate before OPEC sets P2. 
The First Period 
and P2,  as 
given depending on Zp,  Zg,  K1 + AK, H, and R* -  M,, we now consider 
how these magnitudes are determined in period 1.  Here we assume 0,  = 
1 (no taxation of  OPEC investment income). The USA private sector 
takes OPEC and USA government policy variables (P,, H, €$,  Ig)  as 
given to maximize 
Taking the solutions to the second period choice variables, 
(28)  WC,) + PUCd  > 
with respect to 01,  AK, and Ip,  where 
(29a)  C, = F(K1, 0,) -  Pl(O1  +  Ip)  -  AK + H -  Tl ; 
(29b)  C2 = G(K1+  AK, 02P2) -  02 P2(02 -  Ip)  -  G1H -  T2. 
Here Tl  and  T2 denote taxes each period.  We assume that  they  are 
imposed in a lump-sum fashion. The government constraint implies, 
(304  Tl = (1 -  0,) PI (01 +  Ip)  +PIP; 
(30b)  T2  = (1 -  0,)  P2  [02  -  D(Ip)]  -  [P2D(Zg)]. 
First-order conditions for a maximum are: 
(31a)  F2(K1, 0,) -  elPl 5  0  (=  0 if  0, > 0). 
(31b)  -  U’(C1) + PU’(C2)Fl (Kl + AK, 02) 
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(31c)  -  uyc,) O,P, + pu(c2)  ~,P,D~(I~) 
50  (=OifIp>0). 
These equations implicitly define functions for first period oil demand, 
investment demand, and private inventory demand. 
Consider now the problem facing the USA  under rules Rl(a) and 
Rl(b). Taking PI parametrically, the USA  chooses  and Zg to maximize 
social welfare, given, as before, by expression (28). The USA  correctly 
anticipates the effect of  its decisions this period on this period's private 
sector behavior (as determined by  equations [31]) and on the second 
period outcome. 
Consider the first-order equation for a maximum with respect to P: 
dP2  + -  [O, -  D(Z")] -  D(ZP) 
dZg 
50  (=OifF>O). 
From equation (27) (dP,ldZg)  is positive. Comparing (32) with (31c), 
observe that the USA  has an incentive to invest in inventories beyond 
that facing the private sector. The reason is that individuals in the USA 
private sector, taking both  eIPl and O,P,  as given, do not take into 
account the effect of their own inventory decision on lowering the second 
period price. The USA  internalizes the effect of its own inventory deci- 
sion on the second period price. The USA  then, facing a givenJirst period 
price, has an incentive to accumulate inventories even when the private 
sector does not. 
Subsidizing first period imports, via setting el > 1,  provides an alterna- 
tive method of lowering P, by raising private inventories. This approach 
subsidizes first period oil consumption as well as inventory accumulation, 
however. A  direct government investment in inventories does not suffer 
this difficulty. The private sector continues to establish F2 = Pl whether 
or not Zg is positive. If  the government has available a storage technology 
that is not, at the margin, inferior to that provided by the private sector, 
then the optimal first period tariff is zero. 
Consider now OPEC's decision. OPEC  chooses Pl and H to maximize 
U*(CT)  + P*(C,*)  9 
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Under rule Rl(a), OPEC acts anticipating the effect of its choice on Zg 
and tll, as well as on the second period equilibrium. Under rules Rl(b) 
and Rl(c), it treats Zg  and  O1  as given. USA inventories augment first 
period demand. Under rules Rl(b) and Rl(c), Pl is necessarily greater 
when Zg  >O.  This result does not necessarily emerge when OPEC is a 
leader. If  Zg is very price elastic, it is conceivable that a government 
inventory purchase could lower Pl. In any event, OPEC will set Pl at a 
higher level under rules Rl(b) and Rl(c), given any level of  Zg. 
and Zg anticipating 
OPEC’s response. Because an increase in Zg  now raises Pl,  the USA has 
less incentive to implement a reserve policy. While releasing the inven- 
tory lowers the price in period 2, acquiring it raises PI.  Under rules Rl(a) 
and Rl(b), USA policy takes the second into account but not the first, PI 
is a bygone when Zg  is established. Nevertheless, OPEC, in anticipating 
(under Rl[a]) or observing (under Rl[b]) a USA inventory, is likely to 
establish a higher Pl as a consequence. 
Calculating the overall welfare  effects of  optimal inventory policy 
under alternative rules of the game is difficult in a general setting. In the 
next  section we use a simple quadratic case to consider these issues 
further. 
Finally, under rule Rl(c), the USA chooses 
7.5  An Uneasy Case for Government Inventories: 
A Quadratic Example 
We now consider a special case of  the game discussed in section 7.4, 
making specific assumptions about the functional forms that describe 
technology and preferences. Our first and fourth examples assume that 
the behavior of the USA and OPEC is described by rule Rl(a), OPEC 
acts as a Stackelberg leader each period. In the second example they act 
as Nash players, (rule Rl[b]). Our third example is one in which the USA 
acts first (rule Rl[c]). 
We consider the following production function for Qi: 
a 
2 
Qi  = F(K,, Oi)  = a,, Ki -  -L  K? + u2  Ki  Oi  (33) 
a4 
2  + a30i - -  o;,  ai 2 0,  i = 1,2. 
Note that this function exhibits decreasing returns to scale in capital and 
oil. 
7.5.1  The Second Period 
We assume that the return on investment in USA capital is the same for 
USA citizens and OPEC  members and is equal to the marginal product of 
capital, that is, 257  U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve 
(34)  F1(K2, 02)  = a.  -  al K2 + a202. 
That is, USA  sets Ok = 0. The private sector sets the demand for imports 
of oil in the second period by equating the marginal product of oil to the 
market price, that is, 
F2(K2, 0,) = 02P2 and O2  = M2  + D(Z) , 
where Z  = Zp  + Zg = private inventories + public inventories. Then we 
get that 
(35) 
M2  + D(Z) = 3  U  + s(K1+  AK) -  -P2.  02 
a4  a4  a4 
We consider only a limited set of  instruments for USA  intervention. In 
the second period the only instrument available is the tariff on oil. The 
objective of the USA  is to maximize second period utility by maximizing 
C,, that is, 
maximize F(K2,  0,) -  Fl H -  P2  M2, 
02 
subject to equations (33)-(35).  The first-order condition is: 
and the optimal tax on imports is 
Thus the optimal tariff rate is zero in two cases: (i) OPEC does not invest 
in the first period in the USA  (H = 0),  or (ii) oil and capital are separable 
in the production of  the consumption good (a2 = 0). 
Now we turn to OPEC's determination of the second period price by 
maximizing its second period consumption, that is, it maximizes P2  M2 + 
F, H subject to (33)-(36)  by choice of P2.  The optimal P2 turns out to be: 
(37) 
a3  a2  a4  P2 = -  + -[(K,  + AK)] -  a2H -  -D(Z). 
22  2 
Again we observe that if oil and capital are separable in production (a2 = 
0), the capital stock does not affect the determination of oil prices in the 
second period. Furthermore, P2 is a linear function of capital, but OPEC 
has an incentive to decrease oil prices as its investment in the USA  is 
larger. This result suggests why different members of  OPEC would have 
different incentives in setting oil prices conditional on their portfolio 
decisions. Finally, it is important to observe that Pz decreases as USA 
inventories go up. This result establishes a possible role for public inven- 
tories if the USA  in the first period takes into account OPEC supply 
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metrically. That P2 falls as I  rises does not depend on the assumption that 
the USA takes P2 parametrically in period 2 while OPEC is assumed to 
act upon (36), that is, OPEC is a Stackelberg leader in setting P2.  Under 
rule Rl(b), in which OPEC takes 0;parametrically  so that €I2  and P2 are 
set simultaneously in a noncooperative Nash game, then the optimal P2 
turns out to be: 
a3  a2  a2  a4  P2=-+-((K1+AK)---H--D(Z). 
20;  20;  2  20; 
Note that if H = 0 the Nash solution and the solution with OPEC as the 
Stackelberg leader yield the same price. Otherwise, P2 may move either 
way with  (j2. P2 moves negatively with D(Z) as long as 0;  is positive. 
Whichever  game is played  in the second period, the oil price is not 
affected by total capital (K, + AK)  and by H in the same degree. The 
results in the second period are independent of  the utility function since 
the maximization of  welfare is equivalent to the maximization of  con- 
sumption. 
The third logical possibility, of course, obtains when the USA acts as a 
Stackelberg leader (Rule Rl[c]). As we described in section 7.4, in this 
case the USA can impose the optimal tariff, driving the world price to 
zero (the marginal extraction cost for oil that we have assumed here). 
7.5.2  The First Period and the Complete Solution 
Example 1 (Nichols and Zeckhauser) 
To solve the first period problem we have to postulate a utility function 
for both the USA and OPEC. We first assume that utility is linear and 
that p = p* = 1. In this case inventories benefit the USA. We then 
compare the government inventory policy with a taxlsubsidy scheme. To 
do so, we make the following assumptions 
Al: H = AK  = 0, that is, no investment. 
A2: D(Z) = Z,  that is, no inventory carrying costs for oil. 
A1 implies that e2 = 1, and as a result we get the following equations for 
the second period problem: 
(39) 
where ?i3 =  a2K, + a3.  Note that these solutions obtain either when the 
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Nash game or when OPEC acts as a Stackelberg leader. Together (39) 
and (40) yield 
z3  1 
2a4  2 
Mz=---I. 
Since capital is constant, we can write the production of the single good at 
time i as: 
Qi=F(Ki,  Oi)=a+z3Oi--0?,  a4  i=l,2, 
2 
(42) 
where  a1  2  a = ao- -Ki. 
2 
We  consider the economy under alternative USA government policies. 
Case (i).  The USA chooses both M1  and I  in the USA in the first period 
taking the structure of  the period 2 problem as given. Given the linear 
utility functions, the USA's problem is to maximize 
F(K1, Ml-I)-PlMl  +F(Kl,  Mz+Z)-P,Mz, 
subject to (40), (41), and (42) by  choice of  MI and Z. The first-order 
conditions with respect to Z  and M1,  respectively, are: 
(43) 
-  -  a3  -a4(%  + -)-  I1  + A(  a  ii3 -  f3 




Solving for I and M1  as functions of  PI we get, 
a3 -  a4(M1  -Z) -  Pl = 0. 
(45) 
Given the above result  with respect  to USA decision rules, OPEC's 
problem is to maximize PIMl + P2M2  subject to (40), (41), (42), (45), 
and (46) by choosing Pl.  The result is 
9- 
17 
Pl = -a3. 
Hence, we have the following allocation of  resources in the two periods:" 
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I 
ol=---,  02=--, 
17 a4  17 a4 
5ii  -  2  6-  P2 = -  a3, 
I 
Utility levels in the USA  and OPEC are, respectively, 
ol=---,  02=--, 
17 a4  17 a4 
5ii  -  2  6-  P2 = -  a3, 
155 (ii3)2 
578  a4 
U=  C1 +-  C2=  2aoK, -alK:  + -  -.  (494 
Hence, the price of oil falls from period one to period two and inventories 
are 5/11 of oil consumption at the second period. We now turn to the case 
where there is no USA  government intervention. 
Case  (ii).  USA private  agents choose  both  oil consumption  and  oil 
inventories. There is no government intervention. USA  private agents 
maximize profits by setting O1 such that F2(K1,  0,) = Pl,  and they set Zp 
>  0 if Pl <  P2,  otherwise  Zp  = 0. The first-order conditions with respect to 
O1 imply that 
0,=M1- 
As a result, we can solve OPEC’s  problem assuming that Zp  = 0 then see 
whether the  condition for zero inventories is satisfied. OPEC’s  problem is 
to maximize P,M, + P2M2  subject to (40), (41), (49), and Ip  = 0. Hence, 
we get Pl  = P2 = (1/2)ii3, and the condition for zero inventories is 
satisfied. Furthermore, we get M1 = M2 = (1/2)(if3/2)/a4) = O1 = 02. 
Hence, the two periods are completely symmetric, and the model is 
equivalent to the case in which OPEC is a simple monopoly in both 
periods separately. 
Utility levels in the USA  and OPEC are, respectively, 
ii; 
4a4 
U=  C1 + C2 = 2aoK1 -  alK: + -; 
5’3 
2a4 
u* = c;+  c;=  -. 
Case (iii).  USA  private agents choose O1  while USA  government chooses 
inventories. The allocation of 0,  is determined by (49) which is identical 
to (44), the first-order condition with respect to  M1  in case (i). Hence, the 
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case (i): (45), and the final allocation of case (iii) and (i) are identical and 
given by  (37) and (48). 
Result. In the above example a monopolistic OPEC  behaves as a Stackel- 
berg leader in a time-consistent game, and optimal private inventories are 
zero. This is equivalent to the result of zero private (optimal) inventories 
in the case of competition (section 7.3).  However, given the fact that the 
government can exploit the effect of  inventories on oil prices in the 
second period, we find that the optimal USA allocation is to have a 
positive level of inventories that raises the first period oil price and lowers 
the second period price.'2 Hence, the USA  has a real cost of  holding 
inventories, (PI -  P2)Z,  but it creates a welfare gain from changing the 
terms of trade and reducing the monopoly power of OPEC in the second 
period. 
We present the result in figure 7.1.  Moving from no intervention in the 
USA  to a government inventory policy, the demand and marginal rev- 
enue curves that OPEC faces are moving from the solid lines to the 
broken lines. The USA loses the area PTP B A of consumer surplus in the 
first period, while it gains the area P P,*C B of  consumer surplus in the 
second period and here the difference is positive. 
Given the sequence of  decisions that we assume here, in case (i) we 
characterize the optimal allocation for the USA.  We show in case (ii) that 
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the private sector does not achieve the same allocation since it cannot 
exploit the negative effect of inventories on the period 2 oil price. If  the 
only government instrument is a public inventory (case iii), the allocation 
is the same as in the first case. 
Comparing (49) with (51) note that USA welfare is in fact greater when 
the USA chooses inventories optimally. In addition, OPEC welfare is 
greater as well. USA inventory policy is reducing a monopoly distortion 
in a way that benefits both OPEC and the USA. Note that under the 
inventory policy imports over the two periods together are greater than 
when the USA does not use inventories. 
Could an optimal level of  inventories be sustained by other policies? 
The answer is yes, if  the government can impose lump-sum and firm- 
specific taxes or  subsidies to make holding the optimal level of inventories 
consistent with the firm’s profit-maximizing problem. This set of  incen- 
tives must be specified in the first period. However, once P2  is determined 
in the second period there will be no incentive for the government to 
fulfill its obligations. The previous time-consistency argument applies to 
the tax incentive program for private inventories.  Only by  buying the 
inventories in period 1  itself can the government credibly commit itself to 
a policy of  lowering the second period price through increased inven- 
tories. 
Example 2 
Now assume that rule Rl(b) applies, USA and OPEC set Zg  and PI 
simultaneously as noncooperative Nash players rather than sequentially, 
that is, the USA chooses Ig  taking Pl as given, as before, and OPEC  sets 
PI taking Ig  as given. In the consequent equilibrium we get: 
2Z3  3z3 
02=-, 
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p;=-,  p;=-, 
1  lZ3 
50a4 
U = C1 t C2 = 2aoK1 -  alK; + -; 
Compared with a situation in which Zg = 0, the USA is now worse off 
while OPEC is again better off. 263  U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve 
Moving from a situation in which the USA acts entirely as a Stackel- 
berg follower to one in which the USA and OPEC act as Nash players 
reduces USA welfare. The reason is that USA inventory demand is price 
elastic.  Given  the  structure of  the problem  in  period  2, the USA’s 
demand for inventories is given by 
(55) 
When OPEC incorporates (55) into its decision making, it sets, ceteris 
paribus, a lower price. Taking Zg  as given, it perceives total demand as 
more inelastic and consequently sets a higher PI. 
This result is illustrated in figure 7.2. While the USA inventory demand 
shifts OPEC’s demand curve rightward in a Nash game, the slope of 
OPEC’s perceived marginal revenue curve is unaffected by a USA inven- 
tory policy. When OPEC acts as a leader, the optimal USA inventory 
policy  makes  the  perceived  MR curve  flatter.  OPEC consequently 
charges a lower price each period. 
Example 3 
Consider now the problem posed in example 1  for the case in which the 
USA acts as a Stackelberg leader, that is, rule Rl(c) applies in period 1. 
We continue to assume that rules Rl(a) or Rl(b) apply in period 2, so 
that the structure of the second period game is unchanged. We assume 
zero tariffs. 
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The USA now sets Ig  taking the price response of  OPEC, 
Z3  a4Zg 
PI=-+- 
3  3’ 
as given. It is straightforward to show that in this case the optimal USA 
policy is to set Ig = 0. The same solution as that for example 1,  case (ii), 
that  is,  the  competitive  solution  without  government  intervention, 
obtains here. When the USA must precommit itself to some level of 
inventories, it chooses a zero level. This result obtains when OPEC has a 
Bernoulli utility function as well as when OPEC’s utility is linear. 
Example 4 
We now show that a USA inventory policy is not necessarily in the 
USA’s interest even when OPEC acts as a Stackelberg leader. We make 
the following small modification to example 1. Assume that instead of 
being linear in consumption (as in equations [49b] and [51b]), OPEC’s 
utility function is Bernoulli: 
(57)  u* = log cy  + log c;. 
In this case the solution in the presence of  a government inventory (cases 
[i] and [iii]) involves 
5z3  4z3 
14a4  7a4  ol=-,  02=-, 
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28  u* = log cy  + log c; = log -  (59b) 
I 
3  a3  + 210g - + 210g - 
7  a4 
When there is no government inventory  (case [ii]), the solution is 
exactly as that for example 1.  The reason is that, in this case, the choice of 
P1 has no implications for intertemporal substitution in OPEC. Thus 
OPEC’s utility is given by 
1  ii; 
4  a4 
u* = 210g - + 210g -  , 
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Again,  comparing  (59b) and  (60), note that  OPEC has  benefited 
because the USA has pursued an inventory policy. The USA, however, 
has lost; (59a) is less than (51a). The reason is that when OPEC has 
diminishing marginal utility of consumption in period 2, it is less willing to 
transfer consumption from period 2 to period 1  in response to a USA 
inventory policy. It sets higher prices in both periods to maintain a higher 
consumption level in period 2. The USA is consequently worse off. In 
terms of figure 7.1, when OPEC  has a Bernoulli objective function PT  and 
Pg  are displaced upward relative to P. The loss in period 1  from having an 
inventory is consequently greater while the gain in period 2 is less. Note 
also that here total imports over the two periods have fallen because of 
the inventory policy. 
Given that the USA is better off without a government inventory, will 
it in fact set Zg  = O? If  the USA does set Zg  taking Pl as given it will set Zg  > 
0 for all Pl <  (3&/4), given the structure of the remainingproblem. As in 
example 2, once Pl is set it is too late for the USA to affect Pl  via its 
inventory policy. 
Consider a situation in which the USA announced that it would estab- 
lish  Zg = 0. If  OPEC believed this announcement it would establish 
Pl  = (ii3/2). The USA would then have an incentive to establish Z = 
(Z3/3a4)  and drive P2 = (Z3/3).  Anticipating this behavior, OPEC  will in 
fact set Pl  higher. In example 1  the USA nevertheless benefited from 
having a government inventory when OPEC adjusted Pl in anticipation 
of  period  1 inventory purchases.  An implication of  this example and 
example 2 is that the USA can actually lower USA welfare by developing 
the capacity to maintain  inventories.  The absence of  such a capacity 
constitutes a credible commitment not to store oil before OPEC estab- 
lishes Pl. 
7.5.3  Conclusion 
These examples suggest that, in a strategic setting, the ability of  the 
USA to pursue an inventory policy can have both desirable and undesir- 
able consequences, depending on both the nature of OPEC’s preferences 
and on the structure of  the process whereby OPEC sets prices and the 
USA sets inventories. 
Our results can be interpreted in light of Samuelson’s (1972) analysis of 
the desirability of  destabilizing speculation. Like  Samuelson, we  are 
considering a situation in which given demand and supply conditions 
persist for two periods. Samuelson showed that in a competitive setting, 
that is, one in which buyers and sellers behave as price-takers, a destabi- 
lizing speculator would raise the welfare of  both buyers and sellers. His 
own losses would exceed the gain of  the other two groups combined, 
however. Hence, in our example, if the USA faced a competitive OPEC 
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government would be acting as a destabilizing speculator. The gain to the 
rest of the world, not just to USA consumers, would fall short of  the 
capital loss the government would sustain in buying in period 1  to sell in 
period 2. 
In facing a monopolistic seller, however, our examples indicate, first of 
all, that a government inventory policy can raise not only USA but world 
welfare. The reason is that the optimal USA inventory rule makes USA 
demand, on net, more elastic over the two periods. As a consequence the 
distortion due to monopoly is diminished and both sides can benefit. 
More oil is  consumed overall, so  the world  is  moved  closer to the 
competitive equilibrium. 
This result requires that OPEC set prices incorporating the USA’s 
response into its decision. An implication is that to succeed at raising 
USA welfare the government inventory purchases should respond very 
closely to actual oil prices; that is, the government should, according to 
our model, establish purchasing rules that are price contingent. 
A second implication of our examples is that  unless the USA acts as a 
leader in setting Zg before OPEC sets PI,  it may have an incentive to 
establish a positive inventory even when USA welfare is higher when 
there is a precommitment to no inventories. The reason is that the loss to 
the USA from having an inventory is incorporated in the first period 
price. Once OPEC  has established this price it is too late for the USA to 
avoid the undesirable consequences of  having an inventory. From that 
point on the benefits exceed the costs. 
7.6  Other Arguments for Government Inventories 
Our analysis has focused  on convenience  yields,  uncertainty,  and 
strategic interactions to explain the existence of petroleum reserves. Only 
in the third case did we find an argument for government intervention. 
Other economists have analyzed the case for a strategic reserve and we 
discuss their results here. Closest in spirit to our own analysis is the paper 
by Maskin and Newbery (1978) which examines the possible effect of 
U.S.  monopsony  power  on  the optimal tariff  response.  Wright  and 
Williams (1982) have argued that reserves may be justified as a second- 
best response to other (suboptimal) government policies, in particular? 
price controls. Finally, the stockpile has been justified as a means of 
reducing  U.S. vulnerability  to the threat of  an embargo. Tolley and 
Wilman (1977) discuss this issue. 
7.6.1 
Maskin and Newbery (1978) develop a two-period model in which a 
monopsonistic United States faces a competitive set of  oil producers and 
other buyers. The optimal open loop policy is for the United States to 
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establish a monopsony price (via an optimal tariff, for instance) that must 
be equal (in discounted terms) across the two periods to extract positive 
supplies in the two periods. The two prices must be equal because of 
Hotelling’s formula. In the second period, however, the United States 
has an incentive to deviate from the period 2 price that is optimal from the 
open loop perspective. The reason is that the effect of the period 2 price 
on oil producers’ willingness to hold oil in the ground in period 1  is at this 
point a bygone. The price that is optimal from period 2’s perspective can 
be higher or lower than that which was optimal ex ante. If  oil producers 
and other buyers believe the announced open loop rule in making their 
period 1  decisions about extraction, the United States can benefit from 
reneging on  the contract. If, however, the rest of the world anticipates the 
reneging, the United States can lose from its monopsony position. If, say, 
the government has an incentive to revise the price downward in period 2 
and individuals correctly anticipate this revision, the period 1  price will be 
driven  down  as well (again via  the Hotelling  rule). The consequent 
equilibrium can be worse from the U.S. perspective than one  in which the 
United States has no monopsony power at all. The United States would 
be best off  if it could precommit itself to its optimal open loop policy. If 
this is not possible it could benefit by somehow divesting itself of  its 
monopsony power in the second period. Otherwise the anticipation that 
the United States will exercise monopsony power in the second period 
leads to behavior by other agents in the first period that is detrimental to 
the United States. 
In this context, Maskin and Newbery show that the United States can 
benefit from government storage in period 1  as a means of precommitting 
itself to a course of action. By buying stocks of  oil the government can 
establish that it has an interest in maintaining the announced price of oil 
in the second period when, in the absence of  storage, it would want to 
revise the second period price downward. Maskin and Newbery find that 
in a rational expectations equilibrium the United States cannot be hurt by 
a government stockpile while in some circumstances the United States 
will strictly benefit. The argument here is again in favor of  a government 
inventory. Private agents do not have an incentive to invest in inventories 
as  a  means  of  making  the  government’s  optimal  tariff  commitment 
credible. 
7.6.2 
Wright and Williams (1982) develop a model in which agents anticipate 
that in some periods (e.g., when the price is high) the government will 
impose price controls on oil. The private rate of return on storing oil into 
these periods is consequently lower than the social rate of  return. The 
private sector consequently stores too little. There is scope for additional 
government  reserves.  Government  storage here is  a second-best  re- 
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sponse to other distortionary government policies. The government does 
not actually have to impose price controls for a justification for inventor- 
ies to emerge. Private agents simply need to anticipate that controls will 
be applied with some probability. Wright and Williams do not attempt to 
model why the government would impose controls and, hence, why it 
cannot credibly commit itself never to impose controls. 
7.6.3  Vulnerability and Government Inventories 
The threat of  a future embargo by  OPEC can provide an additional 
justification for an inventory. In a competitive setting, of  course, this 
issue does not arise. In the face of a monopolistic exporter, however, the 
supplier could decide to curtail supplies at some moment. A complete 
modeling  of  the embargo issue would  require  a specification of  the 
supplier’s motives in imposing an embargo. A real possibility is that a 
government inventory is a means of  preventing an embargo. 
Tolley and Wilman (1977) show that if  a country is faced with an 
exogenous threat  of  an  embargo  that  a justification  for  inventories 
emerges. There is scope for government  intervention, however, only 
when the embargo generates external effects.  Otherwise, individuals 
would have an incentive to maintain the socially optimal level of  inven- 
tories themselves in the face of  an embargo threat, as we discussed in 
section 7.3. They derive the optimal level of the government inventory as 
a function of the externalities generated by the embargo and the exoge- 
nous likelihood and length of  a potential embargo. 
A more complete analysis would specify (1) the nature of the externali- 
ties and (2) the effect of the inventory policy itself on the likelihood and 
duration of an embargo. An analysis of  this sort could be provided in a 
multiperiod game theoretic framework. It remains an important topic for 
future research. Aiyagari and Riesman (1982) consider the desirability of 
the embargo policy to the  sellers. They find that only in a very special case 
can this policy improve the seller’s position from a purely  economic 
perspective. 
The oil price shocks of the last decade have spawned a large literature 
on policies  toward  oil. A  number  of  other articles have  considered 
aspects of  policies toward oil or optimal stockpile behavior. Examples 
include Nordhaus  (1974), Calvo  and Findlay  (1978) , Gilbert  (1978), 
Wright (1980), Teisberg (1981), Ulph and Folie (1981), Newbery (1981), 
Ulph and Ulph (1981), and Epple, Hansen, and Roberds (1982). 
7.7  Conclusion 
This paper investigates the desirability of  U.S. government oil inven- 
tories in a two-period, two-country model in which the world stock of oil 
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uncertainty there is no welfare improving role for public inventories and, 
leaving aside operating stocks, a precautionary demand for stocks of oil is 
the result of the exclusion of international insurance markets or  property 
rights. 
We show that only under a limited set of  strategic games between the 
United  States and  OPEC can one justify public Strategic Petroleum 
Reserves. Even then their desirability depends on the structure of prefer- 
ences. 
An inventory policy is inferior to imposing optimal tariffs in the two 
periods. But implementing the optimal tariff may not constitute a time- 
consistent policy  (see Kydland  and Prescott  1977): while the United 
States could bring U.S. welfare to a higher level by  imposing optimal 
tariffs in the two periods, the United States may not have an incentive 
actually to impose the tariff in the period in which it acts. A threat to 
impose the tariff  at the time OPEC sets price may therefore  not be 
credible. An SPR, while not raising U.S. welfare to a level equal to that 
when optimal tariffs are imposed, may nevertheless raise welfare above 
that attainable by any other time-consistent policy. An inventory consti- 
tutes a second-best, but credible, alternative to an optimal tariff policy. 
In all our examples the government inventory makes a loss. Conse- 
quently, private, atomistic agents, acting as price-takers, have no incen- 
tive to hold any inventories at all. Inventories serve the purpose of driving 
down the price in the second period. The price is driven down for all 
second-period users. Any nonaltruistic individual considering investing 
in an inventory will not take into account the effect of his own inventory 
holding on lowering the price for other individuals. The case is one of  a 
classic externality. A government that maximizes welfare will internalize 
this effect. Hence, in moving to a strategic setting, a justification for a 
government SPR can be made. As its name implies, strategic considera- 
tions seem to have motivated the establishment of  the U.S. SPR (see 
Senator Jackson’s statement quoted in the introduction.) 
Whether or not an inventory enhances welfare depends very much on 
the structure of decision making in the United States and OPEC, and on 
the parameters of  the system. We find three examples in  which the 
presence of  an SPR reduces U.S. welfare relative to a situation of  zero 
inventories. Nevertheless, once OPEC has acted, the United States may 
find it in its interest to pursue an inventory policy. Holding inventories 
may then constitute a time-consistent policy that is inferior to a credible 
precommitment  to hold  zero  inventories.  Merely  by  developing the 
capacity to hold inventories the SPR can reduce U.S. welfare. 
Another aspect of our analysis is to show that if  OPEC invests some of 
its first-period income in  U.S.  equities, a credible, welfare-enhancing 
tariff policy on the part of  the United States can emerge. We have not 
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inventories here. We consider this avenue as a promising one for further 
research on the SPR. One possibility is, since U.S.  inventories raise 
OPEC’s first-period income relative to its second-period income, that an 
inventory policy will increase OPEC’s equity investment in the United 
States. For the reasons we discussed in section 7.3 and 7.4, this invest- 
ment acts to reduce the second-period price further. There is a second 
channel, then, whereby a government purchase of  inventories in period 
one can reduce the price of  oil in period two. 
Notes 
1. For a detailed description of  the SPR, see Glatt (1982). For a discussion of the quota 
system that prevailed during 1954-71, see Dam (1971). Dam suggests that in 1969 the tariff 
equivalent of  the quota averaged about $1.25 per barrel. 
2.  CBS Television Network, Face The Nation, Sunday, 18 July 1982. 
3.  Nichols and Zeckhauser (1977) show that a stockpile can reduce U.S. welfare when 
the resource  constraint is  binding. In this context, however, OPEC is  not  exercising 
monopoly power by restricting total supply. In fact, even when the resource constraint is not 
binding the inventory can reduce U.S.  welfare, as we  show. 
4.  See Varian (1978). 
5.  Here we assume that capital cannot be consumed and therefore that the interest rate is 
equal to the marginal product of  capital. 
6. This uncertainty could arise either from imperfect information about the physical 
quantity of OPEC‘s oil or from uncertainty about OPEC’s  desire to sell oil to the USA. The 
possibility of  an embargo, for example, creates uncertainty about OPEC’s supply of oil to 
the USA. To be consistent with the analysis here, the embargo must be considered as a 
possibility that is exogenous to the USA’s behavior. We discuss the issue of an endogenous 
embargo in section 7.6. 
7. U.S. imports that year equalled more than one-third of OPEC‘s production. See table 
7.1. 
8. Observe that GI = F,  and so Gt2 = FI~. 
9.  See Marion and Svensson (1981) for a competitive  model dealing with the relationship 
between the oil price and OPEC’s investments. 
10. This result is reminiscent of the well-known Metzler paradox. Here it arises because 
of the interaction between the price of  oil and the return on capital. 
11.  Note that it is assumed here that R* > (19Z3/17a4). 
12. This allocation (case [i])  is optimal, subject to the particular rulesof the game that we 
assumed for USA and OPEC. 
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Comment  John Whalley 
This is an extremely well-written and clearly argued paper which presents 
analytical justifications for the existence of the U.S. Strategic Petroleum 
Reserve (SPR), primarily on potential terms of  trade grounds. What I 
especially liked  about the paper was  the helpful  introduction which 
succinctly lists the main points raised in the paper. 
The main results presented have strong intuitive appeal to them and I 
have no basic disagreement with them. It is nonetheless helpful just to 
briefly summarize them: 
(a) In a two period international trade model in which a country is a 
small open price-taking economy and where there is no foreign own- 
ership of  capital, the authors demonstrate that there is no role to be 
played by a government inventory policy for oil. There is no particular 
reason for the government to be in the business of  accumulating inventor- 
ies of  oil since private markets can meet whatever inventory demands 
occur. Even in the presence of uncertainty, this result still prevails since 
with a complete set of Arrow/Debreu contingent commodity markets the 
free market economy can achieve a Pareto optimal allocation. 
(b) If  oil prices are affected by import volumes so that we relax the 
small open price-taking economy assumption, there does exist an optimal 
tariff for the United States. The authors show that this is a little more 
complex than the traditional optimal tariff  argument which involves a 
static model. In an intertemporal framework the prices in the  two periods 
have to be taken into account in setting the optimal tariff, but the same 
basic optimal tariff argument familiar to trade theorists applies. 
(c)  It is possible to complicate the strategic setting slightly: the authors 
show that if  OPEC  owns some U.S. capital, and if capital and energy are 
complements, then a tariff on energy will reduce the return on OPEC- 
owned capital, providing a further argument for the use of a tariff on oil. 
(d)  The authors then go on to argue that an inventory policy such as 
used in the SPR can provide a second-best substitute for a tariff. The 
inventories are used to change the time profile of  deliveries from OPEC 
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and, in effect, change the structure of demands which OPEC faces in the 
United States in the two periods. It is worth highlighting that to operate in 
this way, the inventory policy should ideally be price contingent so that 
the elasticity of  demand for oil in the United States is changed through 
the operation of  the SPR. 
(e) The authors dispute an earlier finding of Nichols and Zeckhauser 
(1977) that it is possible through inventory policy to make both players 
better off in the implicit two-person game characterizing U.S. and OPEC 
oil trade. The NicholsEeckhauser argument is that OPEC monopoly 
power leads to a distortion in world energy markets and SPR can offset 
this distortion in such a way that the United States and OPEC can share 
the gain. The authors show that this result depends, rather critically, on 
the utility function specification; if  the logarithmic rather than linear 
utility functions are used, they show that the United States can lose 
through the SPR. 
My main points concerning the paper do not involve the analytics of 
these results which, as I say, seem to be fairly intuitive and are both 
clearly and persuasively argued in the paper. I will concern myself with 
the broader context of their applicability to policy discussion of the SPR. 
As the authors hint in much of their discussion, they approach the SPR 
primarily in terms of  attempting to find its rationale as a trading policy 
rather than as an analysis of its impact as a policy in place. When one goes 
back to the events surrounding its introduction, however, as the authors 
state, the SPR is best seen as an outgrowth of the events of 1973.  It is thus 
perhaps better seen primarily as a form of  insurance against further 
embargos and supply disruptions. As such, the insurance approach rather 
than a deliberate approach to manipulate the terms of  trade which the 
United States faces in oil would seem to be both the rationale for the SPR 
and the main viewpoint from which to evaluate its impact. 
In approaching the SPR from this direction, one immediately begins to 
think of the potential welfare costs or welfare gains to the United States 
which might be involved. A very simpleminded approach is to say that the 
main threat of supply disruptions now appears to have passed, and that if 
one discounts the insurance significance of the SPR, then the welfare cost 
to the United States would be dominated by  the associated inventory 
carrying costs. Assuming that oil pumped into SPR remained there to 
perpetuity, with the SPR accumulating to 750 million barrels by  1989, 
each priced at approximately $30 a barrel, would yield a welfare cost to 
the United States in the region of  $20 billion. The cost to the United 
States is simply the foregone resources invested in SPR and left in the 
ground. This simpleminded approach, while leaving many features re- 
maining to be analyzed, nonetheless provides  a ballpark figure from 
which to evaluate the net benefits by calculating what insurance gains the 
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A further crucial issue, however, is the possible behavior of  firms in 
response to the existence of SPR. One approach would be to argue that 
firm behavior totally offsets the existence of the SPR. Firms hold inven- 
tories and form their own expectations both of  future prices and the 
probability of supply disruptions, and knowing the existence of the SPR 
they appropriately modify their own inventory decisions. Under this 
approach, there is no welfare cost to the United States from the SPR and 
no terms of trade effect. The only welfare costs are the resource costs of 
trucking and pumping the oil into the SPR and any administrative costs 
exceeding the private cost to firms carrying inventory. 
An alternative approach would be to make the assumption that firms 
do not offset the existence of  the SPR through their  own inventory 
policies. This could be justified by the assumption that firms face uncer- 
tainty about the precise allocations from the SPR they might receive from 
SPR if  there is  a supply disruption.  Since there are no firm-specific 
contingent claims on oil in the SPR, firms may well view the government 
as unable to  satisfactorily allocate and organize oil supplies in the event of 
a supply disruption. In this case the SPR is simply an addition to oil 
already being held by firms in the United States to cover both normal 
inventory needs and additional inventory motivated by the probability of 
a supply disruption. The welfare cost to the United States from SPR is 
dominated by the  inventory carrying costs, and SPR  would clearly worsen 
the terms of trade for the United States, since the SPR constitutes a once 
and for all addition to the oil demand function for the United States. Oil 
prices must rise unless the world supply function of  oil to the United 
States is perfectly elastic. These two different approaches of  firm offset 
and no firm offset thus make a substantial difference to the perception of 
the impacts of  the SPR. 
In approaching the SPR it would seem that at an intuitive level the 
probable terms of  trade effects are quite small. With current  OPEC 
proven reserves of  perhaps 300 billion barrels plus an additional 200 
billion barrels non-OPEC reserves, if  one accepts optimistic Mexican 
claims, an SPR of less than 1  billion barrels would seem likely to produce 
only small terms of trade effects. In addition, it is important to note that 
the United States is not the only importer of  oil, and the terms of  trade 
gains which the authors focus on so heavily in their paper will accrue also 
to the EEC and Japan. This free-rider aspect of  U.S.  oil policy is an 
important complication which should be noted both in evaluating this 
alternative approach to the SPR and the approach used in the paper. 
Two further issues regarding the SPR and an alternative approach to 
evaluating  its  effects  are  also  worth  raising.  First,  as  soon  as one 
approaches SPR from the insurance viewpoint it would seem important 
to estimate the potential adjustment costs involved with supply disrup- 
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trated in; and how much labor reallocation costs may be. Indeed the 
events of 1973 suggest that not only the adjustment costs are at issue, but 
also the other possible policy regimes associated in the United States with 
the oil supply disruption.  Since the supply disruption by  OPEC was 
accompanied by price controls on oil, this further complicates an evalua- 
tion of possible adjustment costs. Some people would argue that the price 
controls prevented the necessary adjustments taking place as smoothly as 
perhaps they would have otherwise occurred. Thus, in evaluating the 
insurance value to the United States of  the SPR, one needs to know both 
the probability of  a supply disruption and the potential loss to the United 
States should that supply disruption occur. 
A further point concerns a question raised by the authors in the paper, 
namely, the possible use of inventories as a second-best policy for tariffs. 
Little comment is made on the relative  efficiency of  inventories and 
tariffs. As the authors state, there is a potential for inventories to act as a 
second-best substitute for a tariff, but the relative efficiency of  the two 
policies is not fully discussed. At an intuitive level it would seem that an 
inventory policy is a significantly inferior policy than a tariff since the 
costs involve unused resources.  Resources employed in the inventory 
policy are idle whereas with a tariff the resource misallocation is the 
distortion of resources to less desirable uses. While this intuition may not 
fully apply in this case, given that with a tariff a distortion occurs between 
domestic and foreign prices, it is nonetheless an important issue to be 
evaluated in deciding on policy toward the SPR. 
Finally, I have some further comments on the paper of a more analyti- 
cal nature. One point concerns the exclusive use of  a two period model 
rather than an infinite period model. In some areas if  finite rather than 
infinite period models are used, analytical results that apply in the finite 
case tend to be nonrobust when infinite period models are used. Recent 
work has analyzed these questions for overlapping generations and in- 
finitely lived consumer models and comes to that conclusion, and it is of 
some interest whether such nonrobustness might apply in this case. 
A further point applies to the introduction of  OPEC ownership of 
capital into the models. The analysis in the paper assumes that OPEC 
investments in the United States are given, but  in a more complete 
analysis one would perhaps expect  to see OPEC investments in  the 
United States as endogenous. Given the endogeneity of  these invest- 
ments, the externality feature associated with a tariff on energy in reduc- 
ing the return on OPEC-owned capital and providing gains to the United 
States would seem to disappear since OPEC  investments would take that 
into account. Also in this area there is a substantial amount of  recent 
literature, notably that by  Bhagwati and Breacher which the authors 
might rerfer to. 
A further point concerns the third country issue. Most of the analysis is 276  Jonathan Eaton/Zvi Eckstein 
in terms of  two countries but, as has already been mentioned, there is a 
free-rider issue with the terms of  trade effects. Europe and Japan in 
particular free ride on any terms of  trade gain from U.S. oil policy. 
A final point concerns the convenience yield on oil mentioned in the 
paper.  This is the inventories’ yield  from their  availability to cover 
potential shocks to the economy either in meeting increased oil demands 
or covering supply disruptions. What is not made clear in the paper is the 
extent to which the convenience yield of  oil in the SPR is any different 
than the convenience yield of oil in conventional fields. Some discussion 
of  the technical aspects of  this issue in the paper would be helpful. 
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